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ABSTRACT
Verifying software correctness has always been an important and
complicated task. Recently, formal proofs of critical properties of
algorithms and even implementations are becoming practical. Cur-
rently, the most powerful automated proof search tools use first-
order logic while popular interactive proof assistants use higher-
order logic.
We present our work-in-progress set of tools that aim to even-
tually provide a usable first-order logic computer-assisted proof
environment.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering → Constraint and logic lan-
guages; • Theory of computation → Interactive proof systems;
Automated reasoning;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Complete formal verification of algorithms and their implemen-
tations is becoming more widely applicable. Probably the most
general approach is construction of formal proofs in a chosen the-
ory. Interactively constructed formal proofs often use one of the
popular higher order logics, such as Calculus of Coinductive Con-
structions in case of Coq[10] or the chosen higher-order logic of
Isabelle/HOL[12]. At the same time, a lot of progress in automated
reasoning is achieved in the field of first-order logic. For exam-
ple, the Conference on Automated Deduction (CADE) has an auto-
mated theorem prover (ATP) competition, called CADE ATP Sys-
tem Competition (CASC)[4]. Satallax[13], the leading higher-order
ATP according to the CASC results[5], uses E prover[6] (one of
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the leading first-order provers) for some tasks. On the other hand,
CoqHammer[11], a tool that aims to partially automate interactive
construction of proofs with Coq, also uses translation into first-
order logic and multiple first-order automated provers.
We want to be able to verify statements about distributed al-
gorithms where direct application of generic ATP systems might
still be impractical. To that aim, we create first-order specifica-
tions, and use domain knowledge to write or generate proofs as
sequences of lemmas, while automated theorem provers verify im-
plications. As CASC competitions have popularized the unified in-
put format of the Thousands of Problems for Theorem Provers
(TPTP) collection[1], using multiple ATP systems does not require
any changes in the proof format. To support this kind of explo-
ration, we develop supporting tooling for managing the specifica-
tion, preparing the list of lemmas, and interacting with the proof
system.
While it is too early to draw any conclusions from our ongoing
experiments with representing properties of distributed systems
in the first-order logic, we want to present the supporting tooling
used in this research.
2 OUR TOOLING
2.1 Data formats
All of our tooling uses TPTP for all the output and most of the
proof input. We use the SyntaxBNF file from the TPTP distribution
(BackusâĂŞNaur form of the TPTP format definition) and translate
it into Esrap[7] rules to parse the format. It turns out that unambi-
guity of the official TPTP BNF specification allows us to order the
parsing rules in a way compatible with packrat parsing[8]. More
specifically, in every alternation rule the first (after reordering) suc-
cessful option can be taken.
However, the formal specifications of the systems in question
contain large amounts of similar statements. These specifications
are generated programmatically. Currentlywe do notwant tomake
lasting decisions about the structure of the specifications we will
work with, so the generating code is written in Common Lisp and
refactored according to the current specification in question.
The proof itself contains additional definitions and lemmas, and
various instructions such as advice to prove some lemma by case
analysis (with a list of cases provided). We use TPTP Process In-
structions (TPI) extension[2] of the TPTP syntax to encode the ad-
ditional imperative instructions related to lemma list processing.
2.2 Global workflow
First of all, we need to generate the axioms describing our formal
specification.
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To validate that the axioms describe the intendedmodel, we gen-
erate a test run by evaluating the transition rules. We have code
that can evaluate a first-order formula on an incomplete model,
if the fixed part of the model is enough to determine the formula
value easily. The generated runs are validated in twoways: byman-
ual inspection, and by verifying that an automated theorem prover
given this run and the full specification does not find a contradic-
tion in reasonable time.
At our current stage of exploration, the next step involves writ-
ing a list of lemmas (and instructions for their preprocessing) that
should be sufficient to prove the desired condition.
The last step is verifying that a list of lemmas constitutes a cor-
rect proof. Of course, in practice this step is performed in parallel
with the previous one. A part of verification is performed, then the
proof is updated to avoid the problems observed during verifica-
tion attempt. The verification attempts are usually started inside
the part of the proof currently of interest, and stop when some
lemma cannot be proved.
Even after the last step of proof verification our tooling can offer
some further support. We have some utilities for analysing and
visualising the output of an ATP system.
The system currently does not provide any dedicated user in-
terface. It can be used either from a Common Lisp REPL, or via
wrapper shell scripts invoking necessary operations.
2.3 Structure of an example model
The examples will be related to one possible encoding of the Di-
jkstra’s mutual exclusion protocol[9] executed on a single CPU
with multiple time-sharing processes (as illustrated in Algorithm
1). In general, this model has a set of agents switching between
states, and local variables. We automatise a linearly ordered dis-
crete time model which uses an initial value initial and a func-
tion next_moment(T ) which “advances” the time one step. The
state of agent A at moment T is represented by the function value
active_state(T ,A). There are also some other per-agent variables
(and a global turn variable),modelled in the sameway, e.g. counter (T ,A)
which gives the value of the variable counter of agent A at time T .
For a single-CPU multi-process execution we can assume that only
one agent at a time can change its state or variables, and denote
this agent as active_aдent(T ). We want to avoid a situation where
two agents execute the critical section (i.e. have the active state
equal to criticalSection which represents line 17 in Algorithm 1)
at the same time.
The safety-critical part of the Dijkstra’s mutual exclusion pro-
tocol consists of an agent declaring its intent to enter the critical
section, and checking that no other agent has also declared the
same intention.
To avoid encoding a full theory with induction, one can start
with proving just the inductive step: define an invariant then prove
that this invariant at some moment implies the same invariant at
the next moment of time, and that the invariant implies safety. The
reason to delay encoding the full proof by induction is that the
most natural ways to encode induction axiomatically require an
infinite number of axioms. This is often called “induction axiom
schema” — for every formula expressing a predicate, there is an
1 begin
2 Stealablei ←− f alse ;
3 if turn , i then
4 Outsidei ←− true ;
5 if Stealableturn = true then
6 turn←− i ;
7 end
8 go to 3;
9 end
10 else
11 Outsidei ←− f alse ;
12 for counteri ←− 1 to n do
13 if counteri = i then continue;
14 if Outsidecounteri = f alse then go to 3;
15 end
16 end
17 <critical section>;
18 Outsidei ←− true ;
19 Stealablei ←− true ;
20 <remainder of cycle>;
21 go to 2;
22 end
Algorithm 1: Dijkstra’s algorithm for process i with n parallel
processes.
axiom. This axiom claims that proving the base case and the in-
duction step for the property in question is enough to verify the
property for all natural numbers.
2.4 Representation of the proof
In the TPTP format each statement is given a role; we parse the list
of statements and look at their roles. Axioms are introduced in the
specification, and can be used directly.
“Checked definitions” can be introduced in the proof; they are
axioms that introduce simple abbreviations, extending the theory
in a conservative way. We verify that they define a single name
in terms of previously seen names, and use these definitions as
axioms. For example, we can define the safety condition.
fof(define_safety_for, checked_definition,
![T,A1,A2]: (safe_for(T,A1,A2)<=>(
(active_state(T,A1)=criticalSection
& active_state(T,A2)=criticalSection)
=> A1=A2))).
This formula, which can be also rewritten in the usual notation as
∀T ,A1,A2 : (sa f e_f or (T ,A1,A2) ⇔ ((state(T ,A1) = state(T ,A2) =
criticalSection) ⇒ A1 = A2)), says that a moment T is safe for a
pair of agentsA1 andA2 if either at least one of the agents is out of
the critical section or they actually are the same agent. This reflects
a part of the desired property that two different agents should not
execute the critical section simultaneously. The full safety condi-
tion is defined by requiring this property to hold for each pair of
agents.
“Checked lemmas” constitute the main part of the proof. Every
such lemma is first given to an automated prover as a conjecture to
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Figure 1: Structure and proof-steps of our tool.
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prove, using the axioms and previous lemmas. If the prover reports
a success, the lemma can be used as an axiom during the following
steps. These steps are illustrated in Figure 1.
For example, the following lemma is proved as a part of a case
by case analysis.
fof(safety_conditions_local_cases, checked_lemma,
![T,A,B]:( ~passed(T,A,B)
| (passed(T,A,B) & ~passed(T,B,A))
| (passed(T,A,B) & passed(T,B,A)))).
This lemma uses the predicate passed , that is defined to mean that
agent A has declared its intent to enter the critical section and has
already checked that agent B had not declared such at intent at the
time of the check. The lemma itself is trivial, claiming only that at
any given moment either A has not yet passed B, or A has passed
B but B has not passed A, or both agents have passed each other.
We also support defining a limited set of axioms (and/or previ-
ously proved lemmas) to use when proving a specific lemma. This
reduces the proof search space and therefore drastically improves
the performance. There are cases where specifying the proof de-
pendencies manually is easy; in addition, our lemma generation
strategies include generation of such dependency hints where ap-
propriate.
2.5 Additional proof-handling capabilities
We use TPI (TPTP Process Instructions) to specify operations on
lemmas inside the proof. To improve interactive usability, we allow
a special declaration that declares valid all the checked lemmas
earlier in the proof. This can be convenient to skip a part of the
proof that has already been verified earlier, or just to focus on a
step in the middle of the proof before spending time on a possible
unsuitable beginning.
In many cases, lemmas needed to achieve good performance of
the proof search are predictable. Some of the techniques described
in [3] are broadly applicable, especially proving all the components
of each conjunction separately. Another important source of lem-
mas is case-by-case analysis, which requires choosing the cases but
becomes a purely mechanical task afterwards.
For example, consider the following case. The lemma under con-
sideration claims that if it is impossible for two agents to have
passed each other, and two agents are distinct, and reaching the
critical section requires passing all the other agents, then the two
agents cannot both be in the critical section. It is easier to prove
the conclusion if we know whether some agent hasn’t passed the
other one (in which case we can say it has not reached the critical
section), or both agents have passed each other (in which case we
obtain a contradictionwith impossibility of mutual passing). So we
prove exhaustiveness of a list of possible situations, and prove the
lemma in each of them before proving it in the general case.
fof(safety_conditions_local_cases, checked_lemma,
![T,A,B]:( ~passed(T,A,B)
| (passed(T,A,B) & ~passed(T,B,A))
| (passed(T,A,B) & passed(T,B,A)))).
fof(safety_conditions_local_simplified,
checked_lemma,
![T,A,B]:
((passed_exclusive_for(T,A,B) & A!=B
& passed_in_critical_for(T,A)
& passed_in_critical_for(T,B)) =>
(active_state(T,A)!=criticalSection
| active_state(T,B)!=criticalSection))).
tpi(ca_safety_conditions_local, add_cases,
safety_conditions_local_cases =>
safety_conditions_local_simplified).
It will be checked that the case enumeration is exhaustive, and
then the main lemma will be checked with each of the cases added
as an additional assumptions, e.g.
fof(ca_safety_conditions_local_simplified_case_...,
checked_lemma,
![T,A,B]:
((passed_exclusive_for(T,A,B) & A!=B
& passed_in_critical_for(T,A)
& passed_in_critical_for(T,B)
& ~passed(T,A,B)) =>
(active_state(T,A)!=criticalSection
| active_state(T,B)!=criticalSection))).
One more tool which sometimes unexpectedly turns out to be
useful is definition expansion.We have an instruction that expands
specified definitions in a given formula. It turns out that there
are formulas that are simpler for existing provers if some defini-
tions are expanded. Implementation of this functionality translates
the definitions to expand into code performing the expansion and
uses the run-time code evaluation and compilation capabilities pro-
vided by Common Lisp to run this code.
2.6 Processing the prover output
We have some tools for processing the output of automated theo-
rem provers. If a prover has produced a proof in the TPTP format,
it can be translated into Graphviz (an automated graph layout tool)
or VUE (Visual Understanding Environment, a GUI tool which in-
cludes functionality convenient for working with some types of
graphs) format for visualization, Visualization is supported both
for the details of an individual lemma proof, and for an overview
of the global lemma dependence.
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We also have a tool for detection of unused lemmas. Unfortu-
nately, sometimes removing unused lemmas from a proof makes
the task much harder for some of the provers. The most likely rea-
son for that is that even eventually unused axioms affect the prior-
itization of possible directions of proof search.
2.7 Parallel processing considerations
Following the naive interpretation of upstream TPI semantics, the
operations on proofs are defined in imperative terms and oper-
ate on the entire proof. This currently limits the opportunities for
parallel execution of the lemma-preprocessing code. On the other
hand, invoking external ATP systems provides an isolated task to
each prover instance, and to aggregate the results we just need
to check that every instance has printed a line signalling success-
ful proof. We currently work with proofs in an interactive mode,
observing the proof verification progress step by step. To verify
non-interactively a complete generated proof our tooling allows
to export all the prover tasks, so that the prover invocations can
be scheduled in any desired way (possibly with multiple comput-
ers involved in processing). We do not use this mode of operation
yet.
3 CONCLUSION
We present a set of proof-manipulation tools that already imple-
ments quite a few useful operations and will further grow in par-
allel with the research they support.
We currently use the tool set described in the present paper to
explore the performance implications of using different representa-
tions and using different provers for distributed algorithms. For ex-
ample, we have encoded the inductive step proof for safety of Dijk-
stra’s mutual exclusion algorithm. We plan to develop the capabili-
ties further, supporting both computer-assisted proof construction
and providing an intermediate representation for automated veri-
fication via proof generation. We hope that the approach and some
parts of our code might be of use to others. A mirror of the code is
available at https://gitlab.common-lisp.net/mraskin/gen-fof-proof/.
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